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This paper distinguishes among three types of generosity of social security 
systems: average generosity, generosity towards early retirement and 
generosity towards the poor. On the basis of theoretical predictions, it 
examines the statistical correlations among those types of generosity for 
14 OECD countries over the period 1985-2000. It also shows how they 
have evolved over time and tries to relate this evolution to the process of 
economic integration. There are three main findings, the first one being a 
positive relation between average social security spending and poverty 
alleviation. There is the negative relation between average spending and 
inequality reduction. Finally, over the period 1985-95 one sees that poverty 
alleviation increases on average, but to a degree that decreases with 
economic openness. 
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Imagine a casual discussion involving three Eurocrats in a café on the Brussels 
Grand Place. They are attending a meeting on the "Future of Pensions in the EU". 
They are talking about the generosity of pensions. Each one contends that his own 
country is the most generous. The Belgian contends that his country is by far the most 
generous as it allows workers to retire as early as age 50 and that Belgium has the 
earliest effective age of retirement, i.e., 57 years for men. The Italian disagrees with 
this view: in his country the rate of replacement at age 65 is the highest, and that is the 
relevant measure of generosity. The third one, a Dutchman, completely disagrees with 
his two colleagues. "Generosity to whom?" he says: "In my country, pensions reduce 
the poverty rate among the elderly more than in any other country and that is what 
matters." 
This imaginary discussion illustrates what this paper is all about. The concept of 
generosity is important, but at the same time very ambiguous. We distinguish among 
three types of generosity: one relying on average benefits, one focusing on early 
retirement, and finally one concerned with alleviating intragenerational inequality or 
poverty. A fourth definition would be one dealing with intergenerational redistribution, 
but it is outside of the scope of this paper. 
Two questions are dealt with in the rest of this paper. First, what is the statistical 
correlation among our three concepts of generosity? Second, has this relation evolved 
over time, and to what extent is this evolution linked to economic openness? But before 
doing thisi, we provide some theoretical predictions as to the relationships among these 
three types of generosity. 
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II Theoretical predictions 
 
1. Political support of contributory systems 
 
In order to talk about the relation between average and redistributive generosity 
we have to introduce a traditional distinction between two extreme types of pension 
systems. The first one provides earnings-related benefits; it is also labeled 
Bismarckian, or contributive. At the other extreme, one finds pension systems whose 
benefit structure is such that the replacement rate (benefit to earning ratio) declines as 
earnings increase. These are also called redistributive, or Beveridgean with flat rate 
benefits. In reality pension systems are between these extremes, with Germany and 
France closer to the Bismarckian pole and the UK or the Netherlands closer to the 
Beveridgean pole. 
Programs for the poor are poor programs: A number of recently developed 
political economy models argue that the size of a program depends on its degree of 
contributiveness.  People vote for two parameters that reflect the two features of 
contributiveness and size. These votes are either sequentialii or simultaneousiii. In 
either case and under plausible assumptions, there is a negative relation between size 
and contributiveness. This formalizes a well-known political economy proposition that 
targeting the benefits to the lower part of income distribution is unsustainable because 
of a lack of political support. This idea is popularized by the sentence: “Programs for 
the poor are poor programs”. In other words, a broad program that caters to everyone, 
rich and poor, is most likely to get more political support than a program focusing just 
on the poor.  
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Rich programs are good for the poor: We have just seen that contributory 
programs tend to be larger than redistributive ones. Do they improve the standards of 
living of the poor? In all likelihood. Within the Bismarckian tradition one finds the idea of 
a so-called minimum pension guarantee, i.e., a guarantee provided by the government 
that brings pensions to a minimum level, possibly by topping the existing entitlements, 
if there are any. If this guarantee is sufficient to lift a sizeable fraction of poor retirees 
out of poverty, then a contributory system can end up being very costly, having not 
much incidence on income redistribution while being efficient at alleviating poverty. 
 
 
2. Unavoidable distortions 
 
As shown by Gruber and Wise (1999) one of the main factors of early 
retirement is the implicit tax on prolonged activity, which in some countries is pretty 
high. Implicit taxation can be explained by the concern of governments with regard to 
the unemployment of young people. But even without such a concern, no government 
that tries to achieve some redistribution can avoid tax distortions. In a first best world it 
might be possible to redistribute income in a non distortionary way, in other words, in 
maintaining an equality between the marginal disutility of one more year of work and its 
marginal productivity. In the second best world non distortionary taxes are not 
available. Hence any redistribution entails taxes and pension benefits that induce 
workers to retire earlier than they would in a market economy, or in a first-best setting.iv 
Such an observation would imply some positive correlation between early retirement 
generosity and redistributive generosity. 
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However it can be shown that when the implicit taxes are really too 
distortionary, reducing them could have a double dividend: an improvement of income 
inequality among retirees and an increase in revenue.v To conclude, the question of 
whether or not early retirement and either redistribution or poverty alleviation are 
positively correlated, can only be answered empirically. 
 
 
3. Race to the bottom 
 
One of the main alleged pitfalls of the ongoing economic integration is that it 
would impede redistributive policies at the national level, plus threaten the future of the 
welfare state. The basic idea is that mobile factors of production, labor or capital, can 
adjust their location to any international differentials in taxation or benefits. Hence 
national governments cannot abstract from such potential reactions when designing 
redistributive policies. To illustrate this point, assume a small open economy that 
provides retirees with a minimum pension benefit regardless of the value of their 
contributions. Assume also that workers can move freely across countries. It is likely 
that low-income workers will move in and that high-income workers will move out to 
other countries that have a contributory system. This would lead our small open 
economy to an unsustainable outcome, as it would be forced to adopt a less 
redistributive system. This is what is called “the race to the bottom”, a notion that does 




III Statistical relationship 
 
1. The data 
 
We use two types of data for the average generosity of the pension system. 
AVGEN1 is simply the share of public pension spending in GDP, and AVGEN2 is the 
rate of replacement at 65. This rate of replacement that comes from OECD is compiled 
for 6 typical households distinguished by earnings and marital status. Both are 
presented on Table 1 for the year 1995. Table 2 presents the Spearman correlation 
coefficientsvii between these two indicators. The most and least generous countries 
according to AVGEN1, are Italy and Australia respectively. According to AVGEN2, the 
more generous is again Italy and the least is now Norway. These two concepts are not 
perfectly correlated, as AVGEN2 comes from the rate of replacement of only those 
retirees who are covered whereas AVGEN1 includes the rate of replacement, but also 
the rate of coverage that varies across countries.  
For the generosity towards early retirement we also use two indicators: 
ERGEN1 is the effective age of retirement of male workers and ERGEN2 is the ratio of 
replacement at 55. As one can note, it is equal to 0 in some countries which don't have 
any such schemes. ERGEN1 ranges from 66.5 in Japan to 58.8 in the Netherlands and 
ERGEN2 ranges from 0.7 in Italy to 0 in the US, Norway, New Zealand, Japan, Canada 
and Australia. One observes some intersection between ERGEN1 and ERGEN2: 
countries characterized by generous rates of replacement for early retirees also count 
more early retirees than the others (implicit tax rates on prolonged activity are linked to 
these replacement rates). 
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Finally we have two indicators of redistributive generosity. The first one 
concerns poverty alleviation (the difference between poverty without and with net public 
transfers). It is denoted POVGEN, and ranges from 78% in France to 25% in Japan. 
The second redistributive indicator consists of the ratio of the income share of public 
pensions in the first quintile to the same share in the top quintile. It is called INEGEN 
and ranges from 8.9 in Australia to 1 in France. One could expect these two indicators 
to be positively related. This is not the case as it appears on Table 2. Although 
surprising at first sight this is perfectly understandable. Poverty is just one aspect of 
inequality. A pension system can be distributively neutral on most of the income scale 
and at the same time provide the poor retirees with a good minimum pension. Also it 
can reduce inequality without alleviating poverty. 
 




Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients for all these indicators. We have 
already discussed the correlations between indicators measuring the same type of 
generosity. We now turn to the relations for which we have some theoretical 
predictions. 
Redistribution and average generosity: It appears that using both AVGEN1 
and AVGEN2 and either correlation coefficient there is a negative relation between 
redistribution and average generosity. This seems to vindicate the political economy 
theory which says that the more contributory a pension scheme, the more generous it 
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will be in average terms. Does that mean that average generosity is good for the poor? 
In fact, it appears that rich programs are in this instance good for the poor. 
Poverty alleviation and average generosity: Indeed there is a positive though 
hardly significant relation between poverty alleviation and average generosity: this 
implies that schemes that are generous on average include programs that alleviate 
poverty.  
Early retirement and redistribution: It is interesting to note a high correlation 
between ERGEN2 based on the replacement ratio offered to early retirees and either 
measure of average generosity. That indicates that there is no trade-off between early 
retirement and normal retirement. Instead, if we use the other indicator, ERGEN1, the 
coefficient is negative, but hardly significant. This implies that countries with generous 
but restricted early retirement, are also those that have a generous pension system on 
average. 
Concerning the link between redistributive generosity and early retirement, we 
have a negative, but not significant correlation between INEGEN and ERGEN2, which 
does not vindicate the idea of a double dividend. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
IV Changes over time 
 
The previous section was based on data concerning 14 countries and the year 
1995. 
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We also have data for 1985 and 2000 (see the appendix). This allows us to first check 
if the coefficients of correlation just discussed are changing over time. Then we look at 
the question of social dumping, given that the period 1985-2000 is one of increased 
economic integration.  
 
1. Stability of correlations 
 
On the basis of the previous section we are going to focus on three relations, 
the one between AVGEN1 and INEGEN, the one between AVGEN1 and POVGEN and 
the one between AVGEN2 and ERGEN2 to see how they evolve over time, namely 
over the period 1985-2000. This is presented on Table 3. It appears that there has 
been little change in these correlations among these types of generosity.  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
2. A race to the bottom? 
 
Table 4 gives the variations in the generosity indicators between the years 1985 
and 1995 along with an indicator of economic opennessviii (TOI) that will be used to test 
the existence of a race-to-the-bottom. 
Three evolutions are worth noting. First DPOVGEN, the variation in the extent 
of poverty alleviation due to social security is positive in 8 countries and negative in 6. 
In other words one cannot see any trend towards less poverty alleviation. Second there 
is DINEGEN, which is negative in 10 out of 14 countries. Here we can say that there is 
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a trend towards less reduction in inequality or alternatively towards more 
contributiveness. Finally there is DERGEN1, the change in the effective age of 
retirement. Very interestingly, DERGEN1 is negative everywhere. It thus seems that for 
reasons of globalization or ageing, all concerned countries are under pressure to 
reduce the generosity of their social security systems towards early retirement. 
Appendix Table A5 gives the changes in generosity for the period 1995-2000. We 
observe more or less the same pattern. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
If there is any race to the bottom, it is likely to be more intense in open 
economies. We use the level of TOI instead of the change because the indicator of 
openness is quite stable over the period considered. The level of trade openness is a 
structural feature of a country and should explain the existence of social dumping. 
Accordingly we try to see to what extent changes in POVGEN can be explained by the 
openness of the countries concerned. Appendix Tables A6-9 give the coefficients of 
correlation for the two periods, and for the whole sample of countries with and without 
Finland. Finland’s figure for poverty alleviation is doubtful since part of the social 
security benefits are not taken into account. Indeed Figure 1 presents results that show 
that variation in poverty alleviation is negatively related to the degree of openness for 
the period 1985-1995ix. The R² is 0.62. But it appears (see appendix A9) that this 
negative relationship no longer holds for the period 1995-2000. 
 




The main idea of this paper is that a social security system – including not only 
old age pension systems but also disability and unemployment insurance, early 
retirement scheme and welfare programs – can be labeled generous in a number of 
different ways. First it can be generous towards early retirement by offering workers 
aged 55-65 relatively high benefits. Second, it can be generous towards people who 
retire at the normal age (generally 65). Third it can be generous towards the poor 
retirees by giving them benefits well above their contributions.  
To conclude, we have provided evidence for these three definitions of 
generosity, and shown that they are not closely correlated. The main result is that 
Bismarckian contributory programs tend to offer generous pensions that in turn benefit 
the poor. This is a vindication of the idea that programs for the poor are poor programs, 
and that rich programs are good for the poor. We also note the link between economic 
integration and redistribution. All in all variation in poverty alleviation is related to the 
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Table 1 - Indicators of generosity, 1995 
 AVGEN1 AVGEN2 POVGEN INEGEN ERGEN1 ERGEN2 
AUS 3.798 0.376 57.000 8.9 61.8 0.000 
CAN 5.400 0.571 46.854 3.4 62.3 0.000 
DNK 9.718 - 65.270 3.6 62.7 - 
FIN 9.739 0.594 30.831 3.9 59.0 0.528 
FRA 12.106 0.783 77.979 1.0 59.2 0.499 
DEU 11.174 0.525 70.100 1.4 60.5 0.370 
ITA 13.324 0.800 55.675 1.4 60.6 0.700 
JAP 5.915 0.637 25.400 3.6 66.5 0.000 
NLD 8.002 0.589 59.700 3.1 58.8 0.687 
NZ 5.580 0.439 70.200 3.2 62.0 0.000 
NOR 7.507 0.321 58.200 2.2 63.8 0.000 
SWE 10.627 0.735 73.205 1.2 63.3 0.250 
GBR 8.740 0.457 53.387 3.5 62.7 0.232 
USA 6.348 0.545 36.461 3.7 63.6 0.000 
Source: OECD (2004, 2003), Förster (2003), Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999). 
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Table 2 – Correlation coefficients of generosity indicators 1995 
 
  AVGEN1 AVGEN2 POVGEN INEGEN ERGEN1 ERGEN2 
AVGEN1 1.000      
AVGEN2 0.610** 1.000     
POVGEN 0.371 0.000 1.000    
INEGEN -0.617** -0.407 -0.694*** 1.000   
ERGEN1 -0.370 -0.258 -0.268 0.173 1.000  
ERGEN2 0.829*** 0.633** 0.236 -0.451 -0.748*** 1.000 
*** significant at 1% ; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10% 
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Table 3 - Evolution of coefficients of correlation 
    1985 1995 2000 
AVGEN1 and INEGEN    
  -0.626** -0.617** -0.649** 
AVGEN1 and POVGEN    
  0.582** 0.371 0.349 
AVGEN2 and ERGEN2    
    0.769*** 0.633** 0.584** 





Table 4 - Change in indicators of generosity and trade openness 1985-1995 
 DAVGEN1 DAVGEN2 DPOVGEN DINEGEN DERGEN1 DERGEN2 TOI 
AUS -0.003 0.017 8.600 -2.010 -0.9 0.000 7,20 
CAN 1.339 -0.003 -0.170 -0.804 -1.5 0.000 7,60 
DNK 1.464 - 9.010 -0.090 -1.8 - 7,10 
FIN 1.578 0.039 -10.723 -0.665 -1.1 0.093 6,70 
FRA 1.444 -0.009 9.869 -0.132 -2.1 -0.046 6,50 
DEU 0.272 -0.082 -1.400 -0.041 -1.7 -0.034 8,50 
ITA 2.323 0.000 7.157 -1.152 -1.0 0.000 7,40 
JAP 1.052 - 12.200 -0.010 -0.7 - 6,50 
NLD -0.125 -0.048 -0.100 0.092 -2.6 -0.035 8,40 
NZ -1.358 -0.015 6.000 0.510 -0.9 0.000 7,50 
NOR 1.522 -0.036 4.400 -0.067 -2.2 0.000 7,40 
SWE 1.435 -0.029 -10.867 0.323 -1.3 -0.026 7,80 
GBR 1.149 0.072 -7.270 0.278 -1.9 -0.024 8,50 
USA -0.133 0.028 2.467 -0.247 -0.6 0.000 7,80 































Table A1 - Indicators of generosity 1985 
 
 AVGEN1 AVGEN2 POVGEN INEGEN ERGEN1 ERGEN2 
AUS 3.801 0.359 48.400 10.9 62.7 0.000 
CAN 4.062 0.575 47.024 4.2 63.8 0.000 
DNK 8.254 - 56.260 3.7 64.5 - 
FIN 8.161 0.555 41.555 4.6 60.1 0.435 
FRA 10.663 0.792 68.110 1.1 61.3 0.545 
DEU 10.902 0.607 71.500 1.5 62.2 0.404 
ITA 11.000 0.800 48.518 2.5 61.6 0.700 
JAP 4.863 - 13.200 3.6 67.2 - 
NLD 8.127 0.637 59.800 3.0 61.4 0.722 
NZ 6.937 0.454 64.200 2.7 62.9 0.000 
NOR 5.985 0.357 53.800 2.3 66 0.000 
SWE 9.192 0.765 84.072 0.9 64.6 0.276 
GBR 7.591 0.385 60.657 3.2 64.6 0.255 
USA 6.481 0.517 33.994 3.9 64.2 0.000 
Source : OECD(2004, 2003), Förster(2003), Blondal and Scarpetta (1999) 
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Table A2 - Indicators of generosity 2000 
 
 AVGEN1 AVGEN2 POVGEN INEGEN ERGEN1 ERGEN2 
AUS 5.576 0.351 50.000 9.7 60.5 0.000 
CAN 5.167 0.566 48.878 3.7 60.8 0.000 
DNK 8.285 - 61.240 4.3 60.4 - 
FIN 8.575 0.588 23.270 6.1 58.6 0.517 
FRA 12.123 0.750 78.699 1.1 58.3 0.456 
DEU 11.904 0.499 72.000 1.4 60.4 0.348 
ITA 13.831 0.800 58.700 1.4 59.0 0.420 
JAP 7.961 0.598 32.400 3.2 65.5 0.000 
NLD 7.151 0.614 60.600 2.9 58.8 0.693 
NZ 4.900 0.528 67.100 4.2 63.4 0.000 
NOR 6.833 0.320 63.400 2.3 62.6 0.000 
SWE 9.852 0.696 69.893 1.3 63.0 0.233 
GBR 8.871 0.481 50.518 3.4 61.0 0.194 
USA 6.015 0.556 35.474 3.8 62.0 0.000 
Source : OECD(2004, 2003), Förster(2003), Burniaux, Duval and Jaumotte (2004) 
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Table A3 - Correlation coefficents 1985 
 AVGEN1 AVGEN2 POVGEN INEGEN ERGEN1 ERGEN2 
AVGEN1 1.000      
AVGEN2 0.790*** 1.000     
POVGEN 0.582** 0.322 1.000    
INEGEN -0.626** -0.496 -0.771*** 1.000   
ERGEN1 -0.438 -0.522* -0.117 -0.053 1.000  
ERGEN2 0.819*** 0.769*** 0.283 -0.341 -0.694** 1.000 





Table A4 - Correlation coefficients 2000 
 AVGEN1 AVGEN2 POVGEN INEGEN ERGEN1 ERGEN2 
AVGEN1 1.000      
AVGEN2 0.538* 1.000     
POVGEN 0.349 0.099 1.000    
INEGEN -0.649** -0.503* -0.623** 1.000   
ERGEN1 -0.473* -0.330 -0.099 0.083 1.000  
ERGEN2 0.681** 0.584** 0.263 -0.422 -0.777*** 1.000 




Table A5 - Change in indicators of generosity and trade openness 1995-2000 
 DAVGEN1 DAVGEN2 DPOVGEN DINEGEN DERGEN1 DERGEN2 TOI 
AUS 1,778 -0,025 -7,000 0,805 -1,3 0,000 7,20 
CAN -0,234 -0,006 2,024 0,346 -1,5 0,000 7,60 
DNK -1,433 - -4,030 0,753 -2,3 - 7,10 
FIN -1,164 -0,006 -7,561 2,243 -0,4 -0,012 6,70 
FRA 0,017 -0,033 0,720 0,134 -0,9 -0,042 6,50 
DEU 0,730 -0,026 1,900 -0,033 -0,1 -0,021 8,50 
ITA 0,508 0,000 3,025 0,043 -1,6 -0,280 7,40 
JAP 2,045 -0,038 7,000 -0,410 -1,0 0,000 6,50 
NLD -0,851 0,025 0,900 -0,201 0,0 0,006 8,40 
NZ -0,680 0,089 -3,100 1,070 1,4 0,000 7,50 
NOR -0,674 -0,002 5,200 0,048 -1,2 0,000 7,40 
SWE -0,775 -0,040 -3,312 0,166 -0,3 -0,018 7,80 
GBR 0,131 0,024 -2,870 -0,133 -1,7 -0,038 8,50 
USA -0,333 0,011 -0,987 0,092 -1,6 0,000 7,80 




Table A6 - Correlation coefficients of changes 1985-1995 
 DAVGEN1 DAVGEN2 DPOVGEN DINEGEN DERGEN1 DERGEN2 
TOI -0.433 -0.246 -0.678*** 0.397 -0.212 -0.384 




Table A7 - Correlation coefficients of changes 1995-2000 
 DAVGEN1 DAVGEN2 DPOVGEN DINEGEN DERGEN1 DERGEN2 
TOI -0.031 0.390 0.050 -0.335 0.108 0.027 






Table A8  Correlation coefficients of changes 1985-1995 (without Finland) 
 DAVGEN1 DAVGEN2 DPOVGEN DINEGEN DERGEN1 DERGEN2 
TOI -0.376 -0.160 -0.920*** 0.387 -0.177 -0.292 







Table A9 Correlation coefficients of changes 1995-2000 (without Finland) 
 DAVGEN1 DAVGEN2 DPOVGEN DINEGEN DERGEN1 DERGEN2 
TOI -0.168 0.373 -0.077 -0.273 0.149 0.020 
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